Monday 24 February 2020

Human Camps: Silence and Denial in a New Era

Image from Camp Album Project, depicting "daily reflection of a Xinjiang person" and "perpetual silence, stigma, and representational violence they always have to face alone". The project documents lived experience, trauma, and resistance.


When Eugen Kogon published the English-language version of ‘The Theory and Practice of Hell’, the first book written from inside the German concentration camp system, U.S. publishers cited “apathy on the part of the public” to explain its small print-run. 5 years after the fall of the Third Reich and Holocaust survivors still had to work hard to find intelligent and creative ways to have their stories and the facts heard. If “never again” is to mean genocide should never happen again, it will help to remember that we only remember the Holocaust even happened because its survivors made an unreceptive world listen. Little has changed since 1950. People in Xinjiang have experienced the largest, ethnically targeted internment of minority groups since the second world war. Yet even renowned experts of China struggle to name a real, living person from Xinjiang, despite their growing calls to be heard online and across mainstream media.

The comforting lie that we could never commit such exceptional evil fuses with the shock that such things are still possible in the 21st century, making our era a perplexing one where people say “never again” while watching it happen again. In 1940, Walter Benjamin warned that “the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule”. Silence from the majority who consider themselves unaffected while minority groups are targeted as threats is tragically normal. Naively believing that fascism was an exceptional period aids its return because it prevents us from recognising it until it’s too late. Hannah Arendt famously described the “banality of evil”, that people can choose to retreat from reason and free themselves of responsibility in the refuge of bureaucratic determinism, normalising and routinising violence against groups deemed worthless to their political goals. That people can commit such violence as a routine through a sense of inevitability is more psychologically and philosophically challenging than thinking of fascism as exceptional and dismissing its manifestations. For Benjamin, every document of civilisation is also a document of barbarism.

Why such silence? In a digital age, the evidence from Xinjiang has not only been more compelling and more rapidly available than ever, but also clearer that all global consumers are implicated. While working on the topic, many people who do not tell me why the issue is unworthy of their attention. The reasons I’ve been given, even in 2019, was that “we need more evidence”, at a time when the evidence available included visual satellite images displaying rapid growth of the camp system, official documents outlining funding channels including military equipment, and multiple testimonies of people released describing their experiences. When discussing the consensus among scholars of the subject that the camps and related practices constitute cultural genocide according to the U.N. Convention on Genocide, one friend dismissed the experts, “but there’s no chimneys with fumes of the dead bellowing out”. To focus on the quantity of deaths, in many respects, misses the camp’s purpose and their significance: dehumanisation of peoples towards promotion of the state’s goals. Germany’s “extermination camps” for mass annihilation (Vernichtung) were only one specialised form of concentration camp (Konzentrationslager) and not all concentration camps contained gas chambers or furnaces. Yet all camps were designed to identify, dehumanise, and isolate groups viewed as incompatible with the state’s goals of reviving and producing a romantic vision of an ancient, culturally pure society. The conversation reminded me of an exchange with a Dutch student who proudly told me how Mein Kampf was banned in the Netherlands to ensure fascism could never repeated, before using logics from its pages that his town was being “taken over” and “infected” by immigrants from “outside western civilisation”. Learning about that uncomfortable history would help people recognise its recurrence. This is the engagement Benjamin called for in his Theses on the Philosophy of History; an engagement with history, not a recollection of the past but an attempt to make sense of and respond to the present. Ironically, a talk from a Dutch resistance fighter at primary school, telling the class to “forgive but never forget”, inspired me to read Mein Kampf so that I could just do that.

Since existence of the camps became widespread knowledge, outright denial narratives shifted to downplaying the issue’s significance. Many people say to me, “it comes down to whether it affects us”. Everyone who has lived there or has long-term connections to people who do is affected every day. When they even hear or read the words camp or “training centres”, they are reminded of people they love and people they are disconnected from, not knowing if they are safe, not knowing if they are being tortured, raped, or put to forced labour. That affects us. Widespread existential anxieties about the environment, terrorism, and impending world wars circulate in popular culture. Yet what Benjamin called the “stubborn faith in progress”, blinds us to the uncomfortable reality that we are accepting concentration camps and genocide against stateless groups as banal, inevitably parts of life in the 21st century. Concentration camps not only challenge the belief that the world is progressing but the very idea of progress itself because they are so depressingly familiar. The shock that this could still be happening in the 21st century is useless, unless it shocks us into realising that we see history through the lens of the present and learn that evil can emerge when humans choose to retreat from reason into inevitability.

Tuesday 18 February 2020

An Open Letter to the BBC: What's Islam got to do with it?



Dear BBC,

The Xinjiang research community is delighted that you continue to cover such pressing humanitarian disasters as cultural genocide and internment camps. However, your coverage of the Xinjiang, Karakax papers on the 17th February 2019 fell somewhat short of the rigorous standards associated with your organisation that should continue to be both publicly accountable and funded. I hope these comments are received in the spirit of civic engagement and support to improve your important work with which they are intended.

The key factual problem in the reporting was the representation of the operation of camps and assimilation policies in Xinjiang as focused on targeting religion per se. The expert literature on state and non-state violence in the region by Gardner Bovingdon, James Millward, and Sean Roberts, who have published on the topic for over 20 years, has demonstrated it was only after 9/11 that religion was adopted as an official public-image focus, re-representing what the party-state has always openly termed the “ethnic problem”. Policy documents throughout the 1990s did not even mention religion or extremism yet these events are re-described this way today. BBC journalists do know this, so it was unusual that in your main bulletin, the issue was represented in a manner considerably closer to the perspective of CCTV rather than the BBC or the global research community.

Your own data points to how ethnic targeting does target religion but only as one of multiple indicators of ethnic identity. Some of the key reasons for interning people include plans to travel outside China and the entirely arbitrary “untrustworthy” judgement. Preventing religious observance is one aspect of these policies but they also target language use, travel abroad, friendship with non-Chinese citizens, and general ‘cultural’ demeanour described as “manners education” in the leaked documents. The work of Timothy Grose even shows how narratives of “hygiene”, paralleling more well-known historical instances of ethnic targeting, justify destruction of traditional Uyghur furniture from people’s own homes. Uyghur language has long been removed from the school curriculum and according to the scholars and NGOs you work with, it is constantly monitored in camps as an indicator of extremism and general untrustworthiness. Religion is only one facet of identity and governance in the region, which I hope my work helps show have been described in official documents as a problem of “backwardness” for decades. In 2009, textbooks for middle-school children taught the concept of minzu xiaowang (民族消亡) to celebrate that “backward” minority groups will disappear. Ethnic unity and Patriotic Education textbooks explicitly celebrate the “disappearance” of minority languages as progress. Xinjiang’s Turkic-speaking groups are always represented as behind the advanced “settler culture” (tunken wenhua 屯垦文化) of the majority and in need of their guidance, as illustrated in the images above taken from official exhibitions. This is essential background knowledge to make sense of current policies.

These are not intellectual quibbles over minor details! The framing of these issues has real concrete impact, particularly when presented in mainstream media on an area generally considered specialised. So why does this matter?

Uyghurs and other Turkic-speaking minorities say it matters and ultimately, it’s their identity we are talking about! Uyghur diaspora groups and scholars have been calling for journalists to take heed of the fact that “this is not a war on Islam but a war on Uyghurs”, according to one Uyghur scholar, and “we are not all Muslims” according to another. There is much diversity among Uyghurs and other Turkic-speaking groups in Xinjiang. They feel you are misrepresenting their identity and they are worried about the concrete effects of that misrepresentation.

Audience reception. The reality is that in an age of popular anxieties about terrorism and Islam, your audience is considerably more sympathetic to a “war on Islam” than cultural genocide or camps for people arbitrarily deemed untrustworthy. In my line of work, I encounter British people of left and right-wing persuasions telling me they are not interested in this issue because they “don’t like Muslims” or “don’t like religion”. Your coverage does not cause that intolerance but it cannot reach those people. It may even embolden them with another example of “Muslims behaving badly” and does so by misrepresenting basic facts about people’s identity and governance of the region. Uyghurs in the UK and across Europe are concerned that representation of this issue may encourage discrimination here and give greater global support for the party-state to pursue what they describe as cultural genocide.

I commend that you cover this issue but recommend that you more fully engage with people from the region and consult a broader range of scholars with long-term experience in the region. This will help avoid misrepresenting such an important and complex set of issues.

Yours sincerely,
                                  Dr David Tobin (University of Manchester)